Mark Locke: Prediction Markets Can Outlast Today’s Rules

Mark Locke expects enduring wagering demand, while taxes, court disputes and settlement questions test the structure of sports prediction markets.

11 min read

For Mark Locke, prediction markets can remain meaningful in US sports wagering despite changing rules. State taxes and a disputed Kalshi settlement show how access, costs and customer trust can shift.

Editorial illustration of Mark Locke beside a stadium and changing market gateways

KEY FACTS AT A GLANCE

  • Commercial interest: Genius announced separate Kalshi and Polymarket partnerships in August.
  • Different legal stages: The CFTC framework is proposed; North Carolina’s enacted tax starts January 1, 2027; Supreme Court review has been requested.
  • Settlement figure: Roughly $18.6 million was reported market trading volume, according to reporting citing CNN’s Marshall Cohen, not a verified clawback total.
  • Demand estimates: Eilers & Krejcik Gaming’s modeled demand concentration, handle share and substitution estimates measure different things.

Why Genius can sell across market structures

Genius Sports published its chief executive’s September 14 investor letter on September 15. Locke acknowledged that commercial winners could change:

“Some current advantages will disappear, and today’s winners may not be tomorrow’s.”

— Mark Locke, Genius Sports

The agreements show why the supplier perspective matters. Exchanges need information to define and settle contracts, alongside services to support distribution and integrity. For Genius, commercial exposure therefore includes selling inputs as well as helping partners reach customers.

The company’s August 5 Kalshi announcement covers an official soccer-data portfolio alongside media and integrity services. Its August 4 Polymarket announcement covers selected US competitions, official data, streaming and integrity services. These agreements establish specific commercial relationships, not universal coverage of every sport or contract. That soccer agreement does not establish that Genius supplied data for the Western Michigan football market.

Locke says Genius earns at least as much per comparable wagering dollar from prediction markets as from sportsbooks. That is management’s commercial assessment.

Who pays Genius in each model
Qualitative relationships described in Locke’s September note and August announcements. Arrows show payment relationships, not revenue size.
Customer
Sportsbooks
Data and services
Provider
Genius
Customer
Prediction exchanges
Covered data, settlement and integrity
Provider
Genius
Customer
Market makers
Data, pricing and risk services
Management describes minimum fees plus profit shares.
Provider
Genius
Customer
Operators seeking customers
Marketing and acquisition services
Provider
Legend / Genius media
Arrangements cover selected products. The diagram does not quantify revenue or guarantee future income.
dyutam.com

The diagram maps relationships, not revenue shares. Its central business question is whether useful services retain paying customers as distribution changes. Product restrictions could reduce the volume requiring those services, while stronger settlement requirements could make reliable information more valuable. Neither outcome guarantees a particular supplier’s earnings.

What the demand estimates actually establish

Eilers & Krejcik Gaming’s July monitor puts 69% of modeled retail demand in states without legal online sportsbooks. That is a geographic model, not a count showing that 69% of customers are new to wagering. It supports examining access as a reason for demand, but cannot establish how those customers would behave after an access restriction.

The roughly 2% handle-share figure cited by Locke also needs its original denominator. DraftKings’ May 7 presentation cites EKG’s April 28 work using first-quarter data for 17 states with more than eight online sportsbooks, spanning mature and developing markets. Handle means the amount wagered, rather than operator revenue.

EKG’s July summary separately gives a provisional 2–4% substitution estimate in competitive online-sportsbook states. Substitution estimates wagering displaced from sportsbooks; market share describes a share of measured activity. The periods and measures differ, so the figures cannot be treated as a simple revision from 2% to 4%.

These distinctions matter for the idea that liquidity will stay. Liquidity is the ability to find a trade at available prices, which requires counterparties as well as interested customers. Geographic demand estimates do not prove retention at Kalshi or another venue. Dyutam’s coverage of Kalshi’s March Madness pricing comparison addresses another part of the competitive offer; pricing alone cannot settle the retention question.

Four ways the rules can reshape the market

Access is being contested in court. The Third Circuit supported preliminary protection in the New Jersey dispute on April 6; the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result in the Nevada litigation on August 28. Both decisions concern preliminary injunctions, which govern interim protection. New Jersey’s Supreme Court petition was filed September 2 and docketed September 8 as No. 26-299, with a response due October 8. A request for review is not a grant of review or a merits ruling. The Third Circuit ruling and preemption dispute explain the underlying federal-versus-state issue.

Product rules are being proposed federally. The CFTC announced its framework June 10 and published it June 12. It remains a proposal, including contract-specific public-interest review and provisions addressing reliable settlement information. It allows multiple appropriate data sources; it does not require exchanges to buy Genius data. That distinction separates a possible commercial opportunity from a regulatory entitlement. Dyutam’s CFTC sports prediction-market rules coverage examines the broader proposal.

Taxes can alter costs without resolving access. North Carolina enacted a 6% levy on apportioned net trading-fee revenue, effective January 1, 2027. Illinois enacted a different base: 1.75% on the first 5 million exchange wagers in a fiscal year and 3.5% thereafter. Those percentages are not directly comparable because one applies to fee revenue and the other to wagers.

Illinois also requires a procedural qualifier. A June 29 agreement bars enforcement against Kalshi pending a preliminary-injunction decision; InGame reported September 12 that the pause remained. The levy has not thereby been invalidated. HB 5811, introduced September 2, proposes repeal but has not passed, and current receipts have not been verified. The separate Pennsylvania prediction-market licensing proposal offers another example of a state considering its own framework.

Supplier scrutiny can extend beyond exchanges. Connecticut announced nine cease-and-desist actions and nearly 30 subpoenas on September 10. The subpoena recipients included Genius Sports Media and Genius Tech International. Connecticut explicitly said recipients were not under investigation. Information requests can expose business relationships to scrutiny without establishing wrongdoing by the companies receiving them.

What can change even if demand persists
U.S. status as of September 16, 2026. Access, products, taxes and supplier scrutiny are separate decisions.
Courts
MechanismAccess
StatusSupreme Court petition in the New Jersey case pending; review had not been granted in the checked docket.
Possible business effectWhere sports contracts can be offered.
CFTC
MechanismProducts and settlement
StatusJune proposal: contract-specific public-interest review and suitable settlement data.
Possible business effectPermissible products and compliance requirements.
North Carolina
MechanismFee revenue
Status6% of apportioned net trading fee revenue; effective January 1, 2027.
Possible business effectOperator economics.
Illinois
MechanismTransactions
Status1.75% on the first 5 million exchange wagers per fiscal year; 3.5% thereafter. Enacted; enforcement against Kalshi paused pending its injunction request. Repeal bill introduced.
Possible business effectTransaction economics and pricing.
Connecticut
MechanismPlatform and supplier scrutiny
Status9 platform orders and nearly 30 information subpoenas, including to Genius entities. Subpoena recipients expressly were not under investigation.
Possible business effectInformation demands and supplier scrutiny.
Business effects are analysis, not forecasts. North Carolina and Illinois use different tax bases; their rates are not directly comparable.
dyutam.com

Each mechanism changes a different operating condition. A favorable access decision would not settle tax treatment, and a settlement-data rule would not determine customer acquisition costs. The matrix therefore separates legal status from the business consequence each measure could produce.

The Michigan correction tests settlement trust

Michigan beat Western Michigan 13–12 on September 5 after a second was restored to the game clock. Both universities’ accounts establish the sporting outcome. ReadWrite reported September 6 that Kalshi corrected an incorrectly settled winner market, citing CNN reporter Marshall Cohen’s figure of approximately $18.6 million in market trading volume.

That volume is not a verified measure of money clawed back. It cannot be substituted for the value of incorrect payouts, affected balances or customer losses. Using it as a clawback total would turn a market-activity figure into a claim the evidence does not establish.

A separate September 6 Kalshi notice invoked Rule 5.11 for review and potential cancellation of certain multivariate trades, or combinations of outcomes. It covered trades after September 5 at 22:50:56 Eastern containing Western Michigan “Yes” or Michigan “No.” That review must be distinguished from correcting the standalone winner market. The notice does not by itself establish that every reviewed trade was canceled.

Michigan–Western Michigan: correction and trade review
September 2026: a winner-market settlement correction and a separate review of related combo trades. Report dates are labeled where exact action times are not established.
  1. SEP 5Game result
    Michigan wins 13–12
    Officials restore one second to the game clock before Michigan’s winning finish.
  2. SEP 6Report date
    Winner market
    Kalshi confirms a settlement correction
    An erroneous winner-market settlement is corrected. The exact time of the correction is not established.
  3. SEP 6Notice issued
    Combo-trade review
    Rule 5.11 review and potential cancellation
    Applies to multivariate trades after September 5 at 10:50:56 p.m. ET containing Western Michigan Yes or Michigan No.
  4. SEP 7Statement reported
    Coinbase announces its customer treatment
    Coinbase says it will credit underpaid winners and leave erroneous payouts with recipients. This is announced treatment, not verified completion.
Reported game-market trading volume
$18.6M
According to Marshall Cohen; not independently corroborated. This figure describes game-market trading volume. Total payouts reversed were not established.
dyutam.com

ReadWrite reported September 7 that Coinbase said it would credit underpaid winners while leaving incorrect payouts in place for its customers. That was a reported commitment, not independently verified completion. Kalshi’s help material also distinguishes market closure from outcome determination, but does not explain the root cause of this incident.

The commercial test is what happens after a correction: whether customers understand the contract, accept the resolution and return to trade. Reliable data can support settlement, but confidence also depends on how platforms apply and communicate their rules. Public disclosures provide no platform-wide retention evidence resolving that question.

What would test the durable-demand argument

The next evidence will come from distinct decisions and customer behavior: whether the Supreme Court takes the dispute, how the CFTC changes its proposal, North Carolina’s 2027 implementation and the Illinois litigation and repeal bill. None alone establishes that today’s market structure will survive.

For the commercial thesis, the missing measures are equally concrete: customer retention after restrictions or settlement disputes, trading depth under changed costs, and disclosed supplier economics. Sustained interest in sports wagering could coexist with activity moving between exchanges, sportsbooks and other available products. Durable demand leaves the destination of that activity unresolved.

FAQs

Has the Supreme Court decided the prediction-market dispute?

As of September 16, 2026, the Supreme Court has neither granted review nor decided the dispute. New Jersey requested review in case No. 26-299; the response is due October 8. The petition itself does not decide whether federal law preempts state restrictions.

Is North Carolina already collecting its prediction-market tax?

No. North Carolina enacted a 6% tax on apportioned net trading-fee revenue, but it takes effect January 1, 2027. Enactment and the start of collection are separate dates.

Did Kalshi claw back $18.6 million after the Michigan game?

That figure is not a verified clawback total. Approximately $18.6 million was reported trading volume, according to ReadWrite’s reporting citing CNN’s Marshall Cohen. Correcting the winner market and reviewing certain combination trades were separate actions.

Does the CFTC proposal require Genius Sports data?

No. The proposed framework permits multiple appropriate sources of reliable settlement information. It is not a final rule and does not mandate purchasing data from Genius Sports.

Does the 69% estimate count new bettors?

No. Eilers & Krejcik Gaming’s July estimate places 69% of modeled retail demand in states without legal online sportsbooks. It is a geographic demand estimate, not a count of customers who are new to wagering.

Are the Genius Sports subpoena recipients under investigation in Connecticut?

Connecticut said the subpoena recipients were not under investigation. Genius Sports Media and Genius Tech International were among the recipients of information requests announced September 10. Receiving a subpoena does not establish wrongdoing.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Demand and platform retention are separate — the available estimates do not establish durable liquidity at an individual exchange.
  • Legal status needs precision — proposals, enacted taxes, enforcement pauses and petitions have different effects.
  • Supplier opportunity remains conditional — data agreements do not establish guaranteed revenue or a regulatory mandate.
  • Settlement figures need their proper base — reported market volume is not a verified clawback total.

Sources

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Written by

Aevan Lark

Aevan Lark is a gambling industry veteran with over 7 years of experience working behind the scenes at leading crypto casinos — from VIP management to risk analysis and customer operations. His insider perspective spans online gambling, sports betting, provably fair gaming, and prediction markets. On Dyutam, Aevan creates in-depth guides, builds verification tools, and delivers honest, data-driven reviews to help players understand the odds, verify fairness, and gamble responsibly.

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