Indonesia’s National Police have exposed a sophisticated money laundering operation using 17 fictitious companies to funnel proceeds from 21 online gambling websites through the country’s legitimate QRIS payment infrastructure—seizing Rp 59.126 billion (~$3.7 million USD) and arresting five suspects, with one more placed on a wanted list.

KEY FACTS AT A GLANCE
- Gambling sites discovered: 21
- Fictitious companies: 17
- QRIS payment facilitators: 15 companies
- Payment service providers involved: 11
- Funds seized: Rp 59.126 billion (~$3.7M USD)
- Suspects arrested: 5
- Wanted (DPO): 1
The bust, announced January 7, 2026 by the Cyber Crime Directorate (Dittipidsiber) of Indonesia’s Criminal Investigation Agency (Bareskrim Polri), reveals how gambling operators have systematically exploited Indonesia’s national QR payment system to launder money at scale, according to Indonesian news outlet IMC News.
The Full List of Gambling Sites
Cyber patrols identified 21 gambling websites offering slots, casino games, sports betting, and other wagering products to Indonesian users:
21 SEIZED GAMBLING DOMAINS
Spinharta4 · Sasafun · ri188 · st789 · slo-ldr · e88vip · 1777 · x88vip · 53n · bmw312 · svip5u · OK Game · remi101n · idagame · H5.hiwiniwue · h5 ss880 · officesetup · 777pro · 777n · rr777aa
The QRIS Loophole
The investigation revealed that 15 of the 17 fictitious companies were registered as legitimate merchants with payment service providers, allowing them to accept deposits via QRIS (Quick Response Code Indonesian Standard)—Indonesia’s national QR payment system used by millions of legitimate businesses.
According to Cyber Crime Director Brigadier General Himawan Bayu Aji, these 15 companies served as the “first layering stage” of the money laundering operation—the critical step where illegal gambling proceeds enter the legitimate financial system disguised as normal merchant transactions.
The remaining two companies were used as “active money collection vehicles,” aggregating funds from the layering operations before further distribution.
The Shell Company Network
Police identified 17 fictitious companies (PT – Perseroan Terbatas, Indonesia’s equivalent of a limited liability company) created specifically to facilitate the gambling transactions:
17 FICTITIOUS COMPANIES IDENTIFIED
PT SKD · PT STS · PT OM · PT SD · PT BMS · PT DHB · PT CTS · PT IKB · PT PVR · PT SSD · PT PJ · PT LN · PT LPA · PT KB · PT KK · PT NDT · PT TTI
How the Scheme Worked
The investigation began with undercover deposits and “undercover player” operations—police officers posing as gamblers to trace fund flows. This revealed transactions moving through 11 different payment service providers.
STEP 1: CREATE SHELL
Establish fictitious companies using fake IDs and forged documents
STEP 2: INSTALL DIRECTORS
Place suspects as company directors with signing authority
STEP 3: OPEN ACCOUNTS
Establish corporate bank accounts under shell company names
STEP 4: REGISTER MERCHANT
Enroll with payment providers to accept QRIS transactions
The Suspects
Five suspects have been arrested, with one additional person placed on Indonesia’s wanted list (Daftar Pencarian Orang / DPO):
| Suspect | Age | Role |
|---|---|---|
| MNF | 30 | Director of PT STS; facilitated deposit transactions |
| MR | 33 | Ordered AL and QF to create fake documents for fictitious companies |
| AL | 33 | Collected ID cards and family cards for shell company creation |
| QF | 29 | Created forged documents for company establishment |
| WK | 45 | Director of PT ODI; partnered with foreign gambling merchants |
| FI | — | WANTED (DPO) — Ordered MNF to create PT STS as merchant |
The Foreign Connection
One detail stands out: suspect WK’s company, PT ODI, “partnered with foreign merchants operating in online gambling.” This confirms what Indonesia’s broader crackdown data has shown—that domestic shell company networks often serve as payment rails for offshore gambling operations based in Cambodia, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian hubs.
Suspects face charges under Indonesia’s ITE Law (Electronic Information and Transactions) and the country’s Money Laundering Law (TPPU). Director Himawan indicated the investigation is ongoing: “We are still developing this case, investigating the involvement of other parties, especially those who facilitated the creation of fictitious company documents.”
Why This Matters
This case illustrates exactly why regulators worldwide are tightening controls on payment infrastructure. When gambling operators can freely register as legitimate merchants, the national payment system itself becomes a money laundering tool.
Brazil’s approach—requiring all gambling payments to flow through Pix with verified bank accounts—is designed to prevent exactly this kind of shell company exploitation. Indonesia’s QRIS system, by contrast, allowed 15 fictitious companies to process gambling deposits as if they were normal merchant transactions.
This bust adds to Indonesia’s ongoing enforcement tally. Through 2024, authorities reported over 9,000 arrests and Rp 861.8 billion seized in gambling-related operations. The Rp 59.1 billion from this single case represents a significant addition to that figure—and the investigation continues.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
- 21 gambling sites exposed — offering slots, casino games, and sports betting to Indonesian users
- QRIS payment system exploited — 15 shell companies registered as legitimate merchants to process deposits
- 17 fictitious companies created — using fake identities and forged documents for corporate registration
- Foreign merchant connections — confirms cross-border gambling network ties to offshore operators
- Investigation ongoing — police developing case against additional facilitators and document forgers