Inside the NCAA Point-Shaving Scandal: 26 Defendants, 29 Rigged Games, 17 Programs

Federal prosecutors have unsealed one of the largest sports corruption cases in American history—charging 26 individuals in a sprawling point-shaving conspiracy that infected at least 17 NCAA basketball programs, with investigators alleging that a network of gamblers, trainers, and former players manipulated 29 games over three years while laundering millions through offshore betting markets.

Basketball court with shattered backboard, player in shame, FBI badge, scales of justice, gavel, and cash representing the NCAA point-shaving scandal

KEY FACTS AT A GLANCE

  • Case: United States v. Jalen Smith et al., unsealed January 2026
  • Defendants: 26 charged, including 15+ current/former NCAA players
  • Games fixed: 29 confirmed, spanning September 2022 – February 2025
  • Schools implicated: 17+ NCAA Division I programs
  • Charges: Bribery in sporting contests (5 years max), wire fraud conspiracy (20 years max)
  • Origin: Chinese Basketball Association (CBA) — scheme refined before targeting NCAA
  • Key evidence: Encrypted texts, including “Death, taxes, and Chinese basketball” message
26
Defendants Charged
29
Games Fixed
17+
Schools Implicated
$1M+
In Documented Bets

The Indictment: A Systemic Failure Exposed

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, led by U.S. Attorney David Metcalf, revealed the charges in January 2026 through the case United States v. Jalen Smith et al. The indictment describes a conspiracy running from September 2022 to February 2025 that fundamentally challenged public assumptions about integrity in collegiate athletics.

Unlike historical scandals such as the 1951 CCNY affair or the 1978 Boston College point-shaving case—which were typically contained to single locker rooms or regional crime syndicates—this investigation exposed a decentralized, transnational enterprise. The charging documents list over 39 involved players, 29 specific games fixed or attempted to be fixed, and millions of dollars in illicit wagers placed across offshore and domestic betting markets.

The FBI’s Philadelphia Field Office spearheaded the investigation, discovering how the conspirators exploited two major structural changes in NCAA history: Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) deregulations and the Transfer Portal’s player mobility. By targeting athletes in what prosecutors call the “NIL Gap”—players talented enough to influence betting lines but not famous enough to command lucrative endorsements—the fixers weaponized the economic inequality of college sports.

The Fixers: From Mob Enforcers to Digital Influencers

The conspiracy’s leadership was not the stereotypical mob enforcers of past scandals. The modern fixers utilized encrypted messaging apps, cryptocurrency, and peer-to-peer payment platforms to orchestrate their crimes.

Fixer Base Role
Shane “Sugar Shane” Hennen Las Vegas / Philadelphia Mastermind — high-stakes gambler who operated as a gambling “influencer” while allegedly orchestrating fixes; also charged in separate NBA gambling scheme
Marves “Yez” Fairley Mississippi Logistics coordinator — managed capital flow and recruited professional-level talent; also faces charges in related NBA probes
Jalen Smith North Carolina Basketball trainer and “bagman” — used legitimate access to student-athletes to groom them for corruption; personally delivered cash payments
Antonio Blakeney Former LSU / Chicago Bulls “Patient Zero” — former NBA player who bridged the scheme from China to the US; recruited CBA teammates while playing for Jiangsu Dragons
Roderick Winkler / Alberto Laureano Various Intermediaries — former coaches/players who normalized bribery solicitation as “business transactions”

The Chinese Incubator: Origins in the CBA

Before targeting the NCAA, the fixers refined their methodology in the Chinese Basketball Association. The CBA offered a testing ground: a professional league with high betting liquidity in Asian markets, significant time zone differences complicating real-time monitoring, and American import players operating with autonomy from local oversight.

Beginning in September 2022, the fixers targeted Antonio Blakeney, then a star for the Jiangsu Dragons averaging over 30 points per game. His ability to control scoring output made him a “whale” target for point-shaving operations.

CASE STUDY: MARCH 6, 2023 — JIANGSU DRAGONS

The Setup: Fixers placed wagers totaling nearly $200,000 at BetRivers Sportsbook (Rivers Casino, Philadelphia) and other outlets. The bet: Dragons would lose by a significant margin.

The Execution: Blakeney, who had been averaging 32 points per season, scored only 11 points.

The Result: Without their primary scorer at capacity, the Dragons collapsed, losing by 31 points — easily covering the spread and generating substantial payouts.

Eleven days after that game, fixers bet another $100,000 that the Dragons would lose by more than 15 points. Although Blakeney didn’t play, he reportedly acted as a broker, assuring fixers that a teammate would ensure the loss. The Dragons lost by 41 points, and the teammate was paid $20,000.

“Nothing guaranteed in this world but death, taxes, and Chinese basketball.”
— Shane Hennen, intercepted text message to co-conspirator

At the conclusion of the 2022-23 CBA season, prosecutors allege that Fairley and others delivered a package containing $200,000 in cash to a Florida storage unit belonging to Blakeney — payment for a season’s worth of compromising professional basketball integrity.

How They Targeted NCAA Players

When the conspiracy pivoted to the NCAA in the 2023-24 season, the fixers adapted their strategy. They did not pursue “one-and-done” lottery picks at elite programs who were shielded by massive NIL collectives and professional handlers. Instead, they targeted the “middle class” of Division I basketball — players at mid-major schools or transfers facing financial uncertainty.

The indictment explicitly states that fixers targeted players “for whom the bribe payments would meaningfully supplement, or exceed, the student-athletes’ legitimate opportunities for Name-Image-Likeness compensation.”

THE CORRUPTION PLAYBOOK

Bribe Structure

  • $10,000 – $30,000 per game
  • For Southland/Horizon League players, one payment could exceed entire annual cost of attendance
  • “Proof of funds” photos sent via encrypted text

Recruitment Tactics

  • Social media DMs, encrypted texts
  • In-person approaches via trainers (Smith) or former players (Blakeney)
  • One fixer texted: “send that to him if he bite he bite if he don’t so be it lol”

The Mechanics: Point-Shaving and First-Half Fixes

The fixes were designed for subtlety. The goal was rarely to throw games outright but to manipulate the margin of victory relative to the betting line — classic point-shaving.

Related guides: Spread Betting Explained · Over/Under Betting Guide · Parlay Betting Guide

TARGETING THE UNDERDOG

Preferred bribing players on teams already underdogs. Instruction: lose by more than predicted. A 5-point underdog becoming a 10-point loss raises fewer flags than a good team tanking.

THE FIRST-HALF FIX

Sophisticated evolution: target first-half spreads. Play disastrously for 20 minutes (turnovers, missed rotations, bad shots), then play normally in second half to mask the fix.

PROP BETS & MICRO-BETTING

The “Fresno Three” (Robinson, Vasquez, Weaver) bet on themselves to hit “under” on their own stat lines — incentivizing poor individual performance.

Forensic Breakdown: The Compromised Games

The indictment identifies at least 29 games that were fixed or attempted to be fixed. By cross-referencing the indictment with historical box scores and betting line movement, investigators reconstructed the anatomy of specific fixes.

THE BUFFALO MELTDOWN — FEB 27, 2024

Game: Buffalo vs. Kent State | Target: First-Half Spread (Kent State -8.5)

Compromised Players: Shawn Fulcher, Isaiah Adams, and “Person #5” (likely Sy Chatman)

Wagers Placed: $424,000 on Kent State to cover the first-half spread

The Anomaly: In the final 13 minutes of the first half, the three compromised players — Buffalo’s primary offensive options — combined to score exactly ONE point.

Result: Kent State went on a 12-0 run to close the half, leading 39-27. They covered by 3.5 points. The clumsy execution left evidence in the game tape.

THE DEPAUL CONSPIRACY — FEB 24, 2024

Game: DePaul vs. Georgetown | Target: First-Half Spread (Georgetown -2.5)

Compromised Players: Jalen Terry, Da’Sean Nelson, Micawber “Mac” Etienne, plus an unnamed player

Wagers Placed: $27,000 on Georgetown to cover

Complication: Uncompromised teammates played well. Text messages show fixers panicking: one texted Etienne (on bench) complaining that a specific DePaul player needed to “chill the f— out” because his performance was jeopardizing the spread.

Result: DePaul lost by only 1 point (77-76), but the first-half fix was successful. Smith delivered $40,000 to the players in Chicago afterward.

THE FAILED TULANE FIX — MARCH 2, 2024

Game: Tulane vs. Florida Atlantic | Target: Full Game Spread (FAU -15)

Compromised Player: Kevin Cross ($30,000 payment)

Wagers Placed: ~$200,000 on FAU to cover -15

What Went Wrong: Despite Cross’s alleged participation, his teammates played well. Tulane lost 79-73 — a margin of only 6 points.

Consequence: The fixers lost $200,000, driving them to become more aggressive in subsequent weeks to recoup losses — a classic risk-of-ruin spiral that led to riskier behavior.

ROBERT MORRIS POSTSEASON — MARCH 5, 2024

Game: Robert Morris vs. Purdue Fort Wayne (Horizon League Tournament)

Compromised Player: Markeese Hastings

Incriminating Evidence: Hastings texted fixers: “We might as well do the next one too… Too easy,” referencing a previous fix against Northern Kentucky.

Result: Purdue Fort Wayne won 78-63. The casual attitude (“Too easy”) demonstrates how normalized corruption had become.

The Accused: Full Roster of Defendants

Name School/Affiliation Role/Allegation Status
Antonio Blakeney Jiangsu Dragons (CBA) Recruiter/Fixer, “Patient Zero” Indicted
Shane Hennen Gambler Mastermind/Fixer, placed bets Indicted
Marves Fairley Gambler Fixer/Logistics, coordinated payments Indicted
Jalen Smith Trainer Fixer/Bagman, delivered cash Indicted
Shawn Fulcher Buffalo / Alabama State Player/Recruiter, organized “Buffalo Three” Indicted
Isaiah Adams Buffalo Player, Buffalo fixes Charged via Information
Jalen Terry DePaul / Eastern Michigan Player, central to DePaul fixes Indicted
Da’Sean Nelson DePaul / Eastern Michigan Player, DePaul fixes Indicted
Micawber Etienne DePaul / La Salle Player/Liaison, texted fixers from bench Charged via Information
Kevin Cross Tulane Player, accepted $30k for FAU fix Indicted
Bradley Ezewiro Saint Louis / UAB Player, bribery/wire fraud at SLU Indicted
Markeese Hastings Robert Morris / Western Michigan Player, “Too easy” text Indicted
Airion Simmons Abilene Christian Player, fixed CIT postseason games Indicted
Simeon Cottle Kennesaw State Player, received $100k cash photos as bait Indicted
Cedquavious Hunter New Orleans Player, admitted on Good Morning America Banned by NCAA
Arlando Arnold Southern Miss Player, fixed games to cover fixer losses Indicted
Diante Smith Nicholls State / UT Arlington Player, paid $32k to tank vs. McNeese Indicted
Camian Shell NC A&T / Delaware State Player, recruited teammates Indicted

The Transfer Portal: A Contagion Vector

A critical insight from the defendant roster is the prevalence of transfers. Players like Carlos Hart, Jalen Terry, Da’Sean Nelson, Bradley Ezewiro, and Shawn Fulcher moved between schools during the conspiracy timeline.

The Transfer Portal acted as a contagion vector. A player compromised at School A (like Buffalo) could transfer to School B (like Alabama State) and immediately begin recruiting new teammates. This decentralized the corruption, making it impossible to contain by investigating a single program. The mobility afforded by modern college basketball rules allowed the scheme to spread across 17+ institutions.

The Response: NCAA, Legal, and Legislative

The scandal has triggered responses across institutional, legal, and legislative spheres.

MULTI-FRONT RESPONSE

NCAA Actions

  • De facto lifetime ban for athletes who bet on own team or influenced outcomes
  • Players like Hunter, Short, and “Fresno Three” stripped of eligibility pre-indictment
  • “Layered integrity monitoring” covers 22,000+ contests annually

Legislative Push

  • NCAA President Charlie Baker campaigning to ban collegiate prop bets
  • Ohio, Maryland, Vermont, Louisiana have moved to ban college prop bets
  • NCAA requesting CFTC halt “prediction markets” on college sports

The campaign against prop bets follows clear logic: prop bets (wagers on individual statistics) are the “gateway drug” to match-fixing. It’s easier for a single player to miss shots to hit an “Under 12.5 Points” prop than to manipulate a final score without alerting teammates. The “Fresno Three” case specifically involved players betting on their own stat lines. Understanding how betting expected value works reveals why these prop markets were so attractive to fixers.

Institutional Statements

The universities implicated have largely framed themselves as victims of their own student-athletes.

“We will cooperate fully… neither the university nor current staff are subjects.”
— Tulane University statement

Kennesaw State suspended Simeon Cottle indefinitely following the indictment. Eastern Michigan suspended Carlos Hart, emphasizing that the conduct occurred prior to his enrollment or was concealed. La Salle clarified that the fix attempted against them failed, positioning the university as a target rather than a participant.

The Bigger Picture: A Systemic Vulnerability

The 2024-25 NCAA Point-Shaving Scandal is a watershed moment for American sports. It demonstrates that the integration of legalized gambling into the sports ecosystem has created systemic vulnerabilities that cannot be policed by traditional means.

Three forces converged to create the perfect storm:

Factor How It Enabled Corruption
Economic Inequality High-earning NIL stars vs. “working poor” mid-major athletes created exploitable desperation
Player Mobility Transfer Portal allowed compromised players to spread corruption across multiple programs
Betting Technology Micro-betting, first-half spreads, prop bets, and Asian market liquidity created new attack vectors

The indictment of 26 individuals is likely only the first wave. As “Person #1” through “Person #10” are identified and flipped by prosecutors, the circle of implication will widen. The cynical text message — “Death, taxes, and Chinese basketball” — serves as an epitaph for the era of amateurism. In the new economy of college sports, the fixers discovered, everything and everyone had a price.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Largest collegiate corruption case ever — 26 defendants, 29 fixed games, 17+ programs over 3 years
  • Scheme originated in China — Fixers refined point-shaving tactics in CBA before targeting NCAA
  • NIL Gap exploitation — Targeted mid-major players whose bribes exceeded legitimate NIL earnings
  • Transfer Portal spread corruption — Compromised players carried the scheme across multiple institutions
  • First-half fixes were preferred — Easier to mask poor play when limiting it to 20 minutes
  • Failed fixes drove riskier behavior — The $200k loss on Tulane led to more aggressive scheming
  • NCAA pushing for prop bet bans — Individual stat wagers identified as “gateway” to match-fixing
  • More charges likely coming — “Person #1” through “Person #10” remain unidentified co-conspirators

Sources

Written by

Aevan Lark

Aevan Lark is a gambling industry veteran with over 7 years of experience working behind the scenes at leading crypto casinos — from VIP management to risk analysis and customer operations. His insider perspective spans online gambling, sports betting, provably fair gaming, and prediction markets. On Dyutam, Aevan creates in-depth guides, builds verification tools, and delivers honest, data-driven reviews to help players understand the odds, verify fairness, and gamble responsibly.

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